📙 Documentation

Day 1 Report

ICT landscape and frameworks | 3:00 - 4:30 UTC

đŸ‘€ Nenden Arum

Session details:

This first session invites participants to explore the regional ICT and digital rights landscape, develop an understanding of key frameworks and structures, and examine the powers and processes that create them. It will also help participants to identify the structures of governance and regulation, as well as recognise the opportunities and challenges that arise across different sectors and countries in South Asia as a result of these regulations. 

Session Summary: 

This session explores the meaning of ICT and digital rights, and the gaps in the current infrastructure and frameworks. As ICTs began to dominate various aspects including communication, information creation and distribution, markets, governance and civic engagement, it is more important to ensure everyone has access and literacy. 

Notes:

Regional ICT Trends in Southeast Asia

ICTs are technologies enabling information creation, communication, storage and distribution. In a decade, ICTs have shifted their purpose from mere communications to transforming the way societies, markets and governance function, even driving the economy forward by playing huge roles in ecommerce and banking operations. The convergence of print media and digital platforms, along with the introduction of mobile connectivity, further transforms civic participation.

Early government initiatives were largely focused on building infrastructures for connectivity and accessibility, especially in rural areas, with the aim of increasing opportunities for all. Such efforts have led to high penetration of the internet in most SEA areas with at least more than 70% of the population, with around 90% in Singapore and Malaysia alone. The region witnessed further widespread digitalisation and digital transformation as triggered by Covid-19, bringing most official and welfare services to the online space. 

The expansion of digital technologies has improved access and inclusion among nations, which has opened up opportunities. It also gives the impression of strengthened transparency and accountability for the government, with users able to express their opinions more directly. However, it has also created new harms in forms of misuse of personal data, surveillance, and censorship by the authorities, as well as the market governance dominated by private companies. These issues further increased interest in digital rights, which are exercised and protected in online spaces. 

Structures Shaping ICT Framework and  Policies

Various national and international frameworks and policies have been installed to regulate the use of ICTs and platforms, recognising governments, private sectors, and civil society as the main stakeholders of the digital landscape. Most countries are recommended to abide by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas across borders. Other mechanisms include:

Several regional treatises and plans have been implemented, such as ASEAN Digital Masterplan and the ASEAN ICT Masterplans (2015, 2020), with the current focus on the digital economy and digital roadmap using ICT for connecting countries and opportunities for expats, and patchwork of cybercrime, media and surveillance laws. Strong policies on the innovation ecosystem have been developed, in which governments are providing investments on tech development. With the introduction of AI, governments are looking into developing it as infrastructure and as a platform in itself. CSOs aim to propose new workplans with a human rights-based approach for the upcoming ASEAN ICT Masterplan (2026-2030). 

At the national level, legislations and regulations have been tabled to address pertinent issues such as ICT connectivity, digital regulation, curbing cybercrime, and ensuring privacy and data protection. Most national frameworks include institutionalising ICT ministries & regulators, cybersecurity agencies, law enforcements, and government-private sector partnerships. 

Private sectors’ role in accountability

Some governments, like the Philippines’, have heavy reliance on foreign, commercial social media and a mobile-first internet culture. This makes everyone, especially youth, highly vulnerable to the companies. Because these massive companies prioritize profit and their systems are largely hidden from users, this reliance acts like a vulnerability amplifier, exposing citizens to constant disinformation, severe privacy violations, and rampant financial fraud. 

With these cautions most governments seek efforts to impose strict regulations on the platforms, which can cause a strong tension between both parties. Certain platforms have been blocked as an attempt to curb any production or distribution of content deemed illegal by the state, no matter how much it occupies the platform’s space. Users, however, are the most vulnerable as this takes away their freedom of information. 

Regardless, SEA is still a valuable market for the private sector and Big Tech companies, promising high usage of its services. Thus, in their interest to maintain the influence, some may form partnerships with the government, or state-produced platforms would take hold of the market. 

Digital Identification and Data Privacy as a Means of Surveillance

Governments often mask these regulations as a form of enforcing national security, implying that the digital space itself is a threat. Such attempts include trying to limit information or combat rebellious movements under the justification of cybercrime. Although these legislations seemed to promise safety for the users, more often than not it has been misused for surveillance, with an effort to limit any voices of dissent and citizen’s attempts to express their rights online. Even certain rights-based approaches are seen as contradictory to security laws. 

Recently, governments are investing in the digitalisation of national identification as a method to increase surveillance. Using biometric identification, its broad purpose is to ensure that all citizens will have access to many government services now made online, and to make certain processes like immigration more efficient. 

However, this approach is concerning as the verification process is still unclear. Many of the options available, such as biometric systems, submission and registration of ID, and/or AI verification tools, are still exploitative and inaccurate. Most systems are still vulnerable to data breach and privacy violations, as the technical operations are not fully sophisticated. 

Digital identification is often being promoted under the guise of promising safety and ‘protecting harm’ for selected groups such as youth and children. Recent news in Malaysia stated that children aged 16 and under will be prohibited from having their own social media accounts starting in 2026. It was said that the measure aims to safeguard children from online harm. Digital rights advocates recognise it is more about enforcing registration with MyDigital ID/enforce eKYC verification under the ‘protectionist’ narrative/restriction-model so that users can be surveilled, persecuted and censored. 

This could also harm the right of the children to access information and knowledge, as social media is also where good and current information gets to be shared. It negates young people’s agency, as they are already online and able to exercise their own judgement with the right support and info. This is also contradictory in protecting children as Malaysia has yet to outlaw underage marriage.

The SEA region also has a bad record in protecting personal data with no proper security safeguards, as there is constant news on data breach used for frauds and identity theft. While a strict regulation is highly recommended, the law has to be drafted with full interest for the public good, and not leave any loopholes for otherwise. For example, the Personal Data Protection Act in Indonesia can be misused by officials to hide traces of corruption. Journalists and whistleblowers who have access to such evidence are often being targeted as breaching privacy. 

Inequality in access and participation

Despite efforts in ensuring all services are made online for efficiency, there are still persistent inequalities in access and participation. This could  be caused by inadequate connectivity infrastructure in certain areas, or an individual’s lack of  capacity in acquiring a device or digital literacy. This gap further decreases the opportunity to be included or involved in the process of policymaking. For example in Indonesia, all citizens are required to have a digital ID to access certain services. Underprivileged people may not have access to acquire this. 

Shrinking of civic space via censorship

The authorities are shifting to not only regulating the infrastructures, but also on regulating the platforms for safety. This includes regulating the content creation and providers, especially with user-generated content (UGC), who may create and distribute harmful content such as misinformation, disinformation, moderation of content distribution and production. 

In SEA, social media platforms have become an important political sphere, where it has become an arena for politicians, civil society and other individuals to shape and spread their agenda. The tension between the government and the platforms’ interests, along with other factors, further cause persistent digital divide and inequalities. 

The question here is on who gets to define which content is deemed illegal? Despite the claims for safety, these regulations are often being misused, with the vague definition and identification of illegal content. Such regulations often breached users’ rights for exercising freedom of expression. 

With the merger of digital platforms and governance, further enhanced by mobile connectivity, there are no strict boundaries between the online and offline space. With a loose privacy law, non-consensual photos of an individual can be taken and posted online, and can be weaponised against the user. 

Rights-Based Approach and Identifying Government’s Capacity

CSOs propose a Rights-Based Approach in digital regulations, anchoring in international human rights law and centers equity, inclusion and digital justice. It demands transparency, accountability, and participation from all parties, in which even regular citizens by way of the ICT connection can question policymaking more effectively. 

This approach aims to prevent overreach in state surveillance, by recommending an independent monitoring mechanism. It also ensures legality, necessity, and proportionality, to limit unjustified censorship. For example, in the case of the government shutting down a certain group from accessing the internet/social media, thus leading to blocking the platform.  This affects all other users who are using that social media for personal and professional use.

The approach also highlights the importance of protecting vulnerable groups and civic spaces by creating safeguards against platform abuse, from other users and from the platform owners itself. 

Although the government is seen as the most vital stakeholder that shapes the national ICT landspace, recent engagements have shown that their capacity on ICT is very limited, if not incompetent. They also have a lack of understanding of Rights-Based approach in tech. 

In response to the case in Malaysia, rather than banning access and pulling a full shutdown on all platforms, there needs to be an increased focus on digital literacy,  safety, and consent on information sharing and production.

However, it is also important to keep in mind that they may not have the intention to take the Rights-Based approach into consideration, limiting CSOs roles in multistakeholder forums. 

Recommendations for advocacy, lobbying and educating

By identifying the government’s lack of capacity on Rights-Based Approach and digital literacy, CSOs can tap in to play the role in educating them. Can identify a champion among public officials to collaborate with. 

Certain political situations can be an entry point for a new political party that speaks closer to the people and is able to touch on digital safety, access and literacy issues. In countries where civil society is quite prominent and has a strong hold on the policy, however, CSOs can advocate to be involved in policymaking. 

CSOs should unite and be in solidarity with each other regionally. By working together as a collective, able to put a bigger pressure on Big Tech companies who see SEA as the main market. A good relationship with these companies’ local representatives are not sufficient as most of their main operations are outside of SEA and they do not have any power in decision-making. Thus it is stronger for CSOs to work and voice out as a regional collective. 

CSOs can also reach out to the youth directly, teaching how open-source  platforms work as an alternative.

CSOs should also be prepared to exist and work beyond social media, as we  could exist before it. 

Key Takeaways: 

Access and inclusion | 5:00 - 6:30 UTC

đŸ‘€ Damar Junairto

Session details:

The focus of this session is to develop participants’ understanding of meaningful access and the regulatory frameworks that enable Internet connectivity. It will also invite participants to examine the digital divide, its effects on marginalised groups, and policies and initiatives designed to promote inclusion. This session will further incorporate regional case studies in the region that illustrate how these issues play out in practice, enabling them to connect theoretical perspectives with lived realities.

Notes: 

The internet is a key enabler for the exercise and enjoyment of many human rights, esp Freedom of Expression (FOE) and  Freedom of Information (FOI). However, lack of adequate infrastructure or connectivity leaves behind the poorest communities. The meaning of ‘Digital divide’ has expanded beyond getting connected. The lack of access creates inequality and no inclusivity means discriminatory for the vulnerable groups. 

One of the major policies on internet access for all is the UNHCR Resolution A/HRC/32/L.20 - 27 June 2016, affirming the importance of the promotion and protection of HR over the internet, emphasizing the internet is the right of everyone and must be guaranteed. 

Recognising that the world has become more digital, with many life aspects having been dependent on the internet such as seeking information, communicating, and even accessing directory and maps, it is more important for internet access to be granted and acknowledged as human rights. Many of the younger generation have become digital native as the digital environment plays an integral part in their worldhood. With most government and official services now made online, it is even more important for all citizens to have access and be able to navigate any restrictive laws imposed. 

Can’t escape the internet, enables all rights, the world is more digital, necessary for life, empowering citizenship, alternative spaces, to enjoy new advancement, information transparency, navigate restrictive laws

Internet access. 

Most SEA nations have National Broadband Plans and Universal Service Obligations/Access Funds (USO/USAF) designed to subsidize connectivity in underserved areas. There are three important components that will ensure the connectivity, which are: 

Structural Policies and Frameworks on Internet Access

Many institutions have recognised the importance of ensuring internet access, with the establishment of the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 

In SEA, different countries have different provisions and implementations, but all with the acknowledgement that it is vital to increase connectivity for all as ecommerce has become a core market. In Indonesia, support is channeled via BAKTI (Telecommunications and Information Accessibility Agency), in which citizens have the right to question the government if they fail to provide or create any infrastructure for disconnected areas in the country. 

In the Philippines, several legislations such as E-commerce Act of 2000, and Free Internet Access in Public Place Act of 2017, and Telecommuting Act of 2018 sanctions free wifi connection for several places. Some public spaces in Jakarta, Indonesia, used to offer free public wifi, but recently these spaces have grown smaller. In other countries like Malaysia, however, there is no explicit act on ensuring connectivity, but rather laws on regulating content and misinformation under the Malaysian CMA 1998.

Recognising Meaningful Access and the Gaps

Mere internet connection is not enough. It is important to recognise what enables a meaningful access, which could be attributed to these three components: 

  1. Connectivity: Beyond having a simple coverage, many websites and applications now require higher speed. Thus, the connection needs to require reliable 4G/5G speeds but also remain affordable. Consistent daily access should also be guaranteed
  2. Hardware: ownership of appropriate devices. Shared access or mobile-only access often limits full economic participation. 
  3. Empowerment: digital literacy and confidence. The ability to use the internet for creating value, not just consuming content.

Many factors have obstructed all users to acquire such access, such as the lack of government support, digital autonomy, digital literacy,  geographical barriers. While the government has made various efforts to build infrastructures in all areas, there are still difficulties in accessing the internet in underdeveloped areas or in areas obstructed by walls or trees, including in the city. 

Women in the region are also often found restricting their internet use to specific apps like social media due to a lack of confidence and skills to explore the broader web. In some cases, where ownership of devices is limited, women, especially those who do not have job opportunities in the market, are being restricted as they are not prioritised along with family members who are participating in the market. There needs to be a marked effort to ensure that access is inclusive.

Ultimately, with both the government and private companies/platforms playing a huge role in gatekeeping access, it is imperative for their political will to address such issues and ensure that every community has equal opportunity to access the proper networks. 

Case Studies

Other reflection questions:

Day 2 Report

Freedom of expression and privacy | 3:00 - 4:30 UTC

đŸ‘€ Sanhawan Srisod

 

Session details:

This session is aimed to explore the laws protecting freedom of expression across the South Asian region, while also examining the restrictions placed on this right within different legal systems. Participants will look closely at laws addressing hate speech, sedition, blasphemy, and defamation in their regional contexts. The session will further provide a brief historical overview of these laws and restrictions, tracing how they continue to surface in both offline and online spaces today.

 

Notes:

Introducing International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)

ICJ is an international NGO based in Geneva, consisting of a group of lawyers that aims to promote the rule of law according to human rights standards. 

 

In 2019, ICJ released the report  Dictating the Internet: Curtailing Free Expression, Opinion and Information Online in Southeast Asia (2019) which noted a worrying trend on legislations and frameworks regarding regulating the internet. Since the release of the report, there had been no changes, if not worse, in such regulations. In the past 5 years, many laws in SEA countries had shown a chilling impact on FoE, with new laws revolving around regulating AI looking similar to previous cybersecurity laws.  

 

Following the report, ICJ had also released various country-based reports, including Cambodia 2020, Vietnam 2020, Thailand 2021. 30% of the reports highlighted the legal frameworks that were further accelerated to curb the Covid-19 pandemic. 

 

Other reports produced are: 

ICJ had also issued statements, including on Indonesia’s ITE Law revision’s threat towards FoE.

 

Currently, ICJ is working on developing The Global Principles, which looks into existing international law and standards  - both UN treaties and regional instruments - and how it should be interpreted, applied, and enforced in the digital space, in the spirit of progressive development. The project looks at various international standards, including criminal law, to regulate the digital challenges that arise especially with the emergence of AI, which has caused rapid changes in tech and digital spaces. 

 

The Global Principles contains 35-37 principles, split into 5 Scopes: 

The project was first launched in June 2025 and aims to be finalised in mid 2026. 

The drafting of the Principles is to be accompanied by advocacy guidance or commentary to ensure that this can be a useful and practical toolkit. 

 

Human Rights Laws on the Online and Digital World

In general, most of the human rights laws were created after WW2 and had no considerations on the digital space at the time. With the evolution of the digital space,  the conversation mostly revolves on which human rights laws that are traditionally applied offline could be converted online, as it is more complicated in the latter. With more government services being transferred online, there is a higher urgency for every individual to remain connected  in order to gain access to certain rights. 

 

Certain rights that are often being interchanged in both spaces are:

The pandemic spurred several other new trends as many services were forced to be online:  

International Instruments on Freedom of Expression: ICCPR

Most SEA countries are part of the International Covenant on Civil and Party Rights (ICCPR). Countries that do not officially rectify this are still bound to the ICCPR’s general rules and practice. 

 

Customary international law - ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, which means there must be a general and consistent practice by States, while there an agreement exists among them that the practice is acceptable. This also applies to certain laws that are not necessarily rectified by all, but most countries should abide by it. One of the most famous instruments that has achieved this is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including FoE. However, it is important to bear in mind that the UDHR is an old instrument. 

Freedom of Expression is based on Article 19 of ICCPR. 

  1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference
  2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; include  freedom to seek,  receive and impart information and ideas of all  kinds, regardless of frontiers, either  orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,  through any other media of his choice. 

In 2011, the UN released a General Comment NO.34 to the Article 19, which includes FoE protection online via “protecting in all online and audio-visual form” . 

 

Requirements for restrictions of human rights online

There are three conditions where restrictions may occur: 

      1. “... subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public); or of public health or morals” 
      2. “Must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality"

Non-compliance trend - patterns of abuse reflected in laws during normal time

Referring to the FoE restrictions under Article 19 of ICCPR:

  1. “... subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public); or of public health or morals” 
  2. “Must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality"

To understand if the restriction is legitimate, one should conduct the 4-part test (to prescribe restrictions):

Whereas restrictions under Art 20 of the ICCPR states that:

  1. “Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.”
  2. “Any  advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”

To define incitement, a 6-part test called Rabat Plan of Actions is used for expressions considered as criminal offences: 

In Meta, one can file a complaint to The Oversight Board who will look based on the  Rabat Plan of Actions. One specific case is that the Oversight Board has overturned Meta’s decision to leave up a video of the Cambodian Prime Minister’s threat towards his political opposition.

 

Laws with FoE Restrictions and Case Studies

Laws that commonly restrict FOE even in the online sphere are :

The common theme is that most laws offer vague and overly broad provisions such as ‘false information’ (against Legality). Some laws also fail to clarify terms such as “public order” “national security” (legality & legitimate aim). This poses a question on who gets to define false information, and against whom. However, despite the ambiguity, such laws would impose severe penalties such as imprisonment  e.g. some acts under A20 (Proportionality). 

 

One participant mentioned that “these laws in the region are often colonial era laws that do  not get updated with any recent human rights development or recommendations, which puts a challenge as these are systems that were never designed with the realities of the region and today’s world.” The slow or refusal of improving such laws in accordance with recent updates and research also creates tension that often jeopardises civil society and actual public interest. 


Another pointed out that such ambiguous provisions, more often than not, diminishes public confidence in the performance of the government. 

 

Case study 1: Computer-Related Crime Act (2007) - Section 14 - Thailand

Vague and broad legality and legitimate aims: The definition of ‘national security’, ‘public safety’, ‘economic safety’ is highly dependant on the authority

 

Instances where this law has been used: 

While most of these cases are often dropped after judiciary oversight, the affected individual(s) and their resources are still largely impacted. 

 

Case Study 2: Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 - Singapore

Vague and broad legitimate aims: Lack of definition on the ‘false statement of fact’; security; public health, public tranquility, public finances, friendly relations with other countries, influence the outcome of an election

 

Case Study 3: Article 27 (Philippines)

Contents against propriety / contents of affronts and/or defamation

 

Case Study 4: Cross-border jurisdiction

Recently an Australian journalist was recently indicted for alleged Malaysian government defamation following a complaint from the Malaysian MCMC, and was filed a complaint via the Malaysian Embassy in Thailand. The question is which jurisdiction’s laws apply when the alleged “defamation” originates from published content accessible across borders.

 

It is worth noting that Defamation is a common weapon in the political sphere. This tactic suppresses any political opinion, which is used either on opposing political actors or even on common public individuals. This causes a decrease in confidence among the public to express their opinions. 

 

Restrictions during Emergency Situations or Wartime

Access to human rights in the digital space during natural disasters can be disrupted by the infrastructure damages caused by the occurrence, which could lead to users having lack of access to important updates and information. It would also cause low capacity on getting access to support and resources. 

 

However, certain states have conducted drastic measures such as internet shutdowns, disrupting mobile signals, or platform blockings to reduce any coverage on potential protests, dissent or their neglect towards counteractive policies. 

 

Some rights may be derogated from, but only if the measures:

For example, in Myanmar: The Telecommunication Law 2013 contains a provision “For the duration of the public emergency, direct any licence holder to suspend telecommunications”. This could create legitimate aim concerns as the “duration” and the “public emergency” are not well-defined, and it could be extended even if the conditions have improved. 

 

Concluding thoughts: 

Troubling State responses include: 

  1. Enacting overbroad criminal laws
  2. Introducing laws that lack precise definition
  3. Granting unchecked

Corporate Responsibilities: 

UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)

Tech companies shall: 

  1. Review their business models
  2. Content moderation practices shall be consistent and sufficiently resourced, with human-in-the-loop safeguards
  3. Adopt clear and easily accessible policies aligned with IHRL
  4. Conduct regular human rights impact assessments
  5. Publicly report on government requests
  6. Establish effective remedy mechanisms for wrongful takedowns

Reflection Questions: 

  1. Most of the issues revolve around the definitions of the term being used. Would it be helpful if the terms are further expanded (thus binding) in law, or would that result in further complications? 
  2. Who has the authority to define such terms? What avenues needed to imagine and realise alternative solutions beyond the agendas  set by big tech, the state  and other powerful forces? 
  3. Cross-border jurisdiction: recently an Australian journalist was recently indicted for alleged Malaysian government defamation following a complaint from the MCMC, and was filed a complaint via Malaysian Embassy in Thailand. Which jurisdiction’s laws apply when the alleged “defamation” originates from published content accessible across borders?

Privacy, surveillance and data protection | 5:00 - 6:30 UTC

đŸ‘€ Jam Jacob

 

Session details:

In this session, participants will learn to examine the different facets of individual privacy in the digital age and the regulations designed to protect these rights. They will investigate the impact of emerging technologies on decisional privacy by considering the various forms of surveillance currently deployed in society alongside the enabling legal frameworks. This session will further focus on the rise of surveillance-related policies and their implications for the protection and promotion of digital rights.

 

Notes:

Objective: 

Privacy and Data protection

Definition of Privacy: 

As far as privacy is concerned, it’s difficult to come up with a universally accepted definition due to many factors that influence the individual and society’s notion of privacy. 

 

European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz v Germany (1992) stated that the notion of private life is a broad one, not susceptible to exhaustive definition. 

 

The first definition on privacy was by the right to privacy was first defined as ‘the right to be le(f)t alone’ (Warren and Brandeis, 1890 Harvard Law article), which is the most cherished of freedoms in a democracy. 

 

Participants were asked to define their understanding of privacy, which includes: 

Right to privacy: 

The right to privacy is commonly understood as physical space free from interruption, intrusion or embarrassment, or accountability. There is an interest in human personality; it protects independence, dignity and integrity. 

 

Previously, many legislations aimed to prevent people from invading physical and information privacy. But as technology advances, the line of privacy becomes blurred, along with its legitimacy. For example, prior to the heavy use of the digital space, trespassing physical properties and accessing confidential documents were seen as invasive. However, although wire-tapping phones or phonelines are inherently intrusive techniques, they have played huge roles in revealing and uncovering some important conversations and information. 

 

Our intricate relationship with technology needs further prodding, especially in defining the boundaries, as “Privacy in an age of primitive technology was largely a function of inefficiencies in technology in monitoring and searching.” (Jeffrey Rosen). 

 

Aspects of Privacy

Example: One participant shared that privacy of communications and informational privacy could affect health and reproductive health centers, as affected women may need  access to get their right to decisionmaking on accessing the contraceptives needed.

 

International Policy Landscape on Privacy

There are two important international instruments on privacy, which are: 

 

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12 (UDHR is a law, not a treaty. Not necessarily binding):

1966 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, Article 17: a treaty, binding

ICCPR Signed: Cambodia, Philippines

ICCPR Ratified: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, PH, Thailand, Timor Leste, Vietnam

Not signed nor ratified: Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore

Other international laws can be found here (slide 11). 

 

Permitted Limitations: 

The right to privacy is not absolute, and the infringements/intrusions must not be arbitrary or unlawful. It should be tested against these 4-part tests:

For example, if the surveillance is conducted according to selected legal basis, then it is permitted. The surveillance method could also be proven necessary if the information could not be retrieved through other means. 

Constitutional Guarantees listed on slide 13. 

 

Comparing UDHR and Vietnam’s constitution, which shares the same principles:

UDHR

Vietnam

“No one shall be subjected to

arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Everyone is entitled to the inviolability of personal privacy, personal secrecy and familial secrecy and has the right to protect his or her honour and prestige. Information regarding personal privacy, personal secrecy and familial secrecy is safely protected by the law.


Everyone enjoys the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, telegrams, and other

forms of exchange of personal information. 


No one is illegally allowed to open, control, and confiscate others’ correspondence, telephone conversations, telegrams, and other forms of exchange of personal information.

Data Protection

This means the individual has control over one’s personal data.

 

Data protection vs data privacy: In many cases, these terms have been used interchangeably. There are many arguments on the perceived distinction between these two concepts, and the closest that is suggested by the RP is by looking where the user is coming from. If you are the rights holder of your own information, you may call it Data Privacy. 

 

But if the individual is acting as a person who has authority over a number of data (Controller, Duty Bearer), then it would be referred to as Data Protection. 

 

In the Philippines, the Data Privacy Act 2012 is mostly based on the EU Data Protection Directive 1988 (the predecessor of GDPR). 

 

Data protection vs information security: while data protection looks at personal and individual data, information security refers to a larger scope of data and information. This includes data that are not necessarily considered under privacy (including weather, economy, etc). 

The earliest discussion on information technology occurs in the 1960s, coinciding with the development of computers and faster processing of data. States began to worry that these systems, if left unchecked, would lead to harm. 

 

International Policy Landscapes on Data Protection:

 

Slide 16-17, which includes the SEA countries’ Data Protection Laws and their year of enactment:

* Myanmar’s Data Protection Regulations took reference from their Cybersecurity Laws

** Only Cambodia has no Data Protection Law.

*** Zana mentioned: Malaysia’s Data Privacy Law is still limited to PDPA that only regulates how personal data is handled by organisations in commercial transactions, and does not effectively address other aspects such as doxxing. Even when doxxing falls under laws such as PDPA + CMA + CCA, these laws do not expressly provide proper avenues to address these crimes because CMA and CCA were enacted before cybercrimes became more relevant.

 

Regional Laws and Mechanisms:

One participant pointed out that the current geopolitical context also shows that such data is also being used for international trade. As part of the tariff negotiations with the US, the Indonesian government initiated that both countries will finalise commitments to digital trade, services and investment, including the ability to transfer personal data out of its territory to the US. This is their attempt to navigate around the EU's GDPR. 

 

Emerging Tech, Enabling Laws and Impact on Digital Rights

Recall: privacy-technology relationship

In the 21st century, we witnessed rapid development in tech capacity to intercept and process communications; major drop in data retention costs. There are various mechanisms in trying to protect data via encryption. 

 

These are the list of emerging tech and laws that are troubling: 

Examples of Enabling Laws: Domestic (slide 22-25)

There are laws that facilitate the usage of these technologies. These slides looked at Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 

 

Myanmar 

Examples of Enabling Laws: International 

Impact of Surveillance-Enabling Laws

Day 3 Report

(To be updated)